CVE-2026-25020

WP Sync for Notion <= 1.7.0 - Missing Authorization

mediumMissing Authorization
4.3
CVSS Score
4.3
CVSS Score
medium
Severity
1.7.1
Patched in
12d
Time to patch

Description

The WP Sync for Notion – Notion to WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on a function in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to perform an unauthorized action.

CVSS Vector Breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
None
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability

Technical Details

Affected versions<=1.7.0
PublishedJanuary 30, 2026
Last updatedFebruary 10, 2026
Affected pluginwp-sync-for-notion

Source Code

WordPress.org SVN
Patched

Patched version not available.

Research Plan
Unverified

# Exploitation Research Plan: CVE-2026-25020 - WP Sync for Notion Missing Authorization ## 1. Vulnerability Summary The **WP Sync for Notion** plugin (<= 1.7.0) is vulnerable to **Missing Authorization**. The plugin registers several AJAX handlers intended for administrative use (such as triggering…

Show full research plan

Exploitation Research Plan: CVE-2026-25020 - WP Sync for Notion Missing Authorization

1. Vulnerability Summary

The WP Sync for Notion plugin (<= 1.7.0) is vulnerable to Missing Authorization. The plugin registers several AJAX handlers intended for administrative use (such as triggering synchronizations or modifying settings) but fails to implement a current_user_can() capability check within the callback functions. While these handlers are protected by WordPress nonces, the nonces are localized into the WordPress admin dashboard, making them accessible to any logged-in user, including those with the Contributor role. An attacker with Contributor-level access can leverage these nonces to perform unauthorized actions like triggering a Notion-to-WordPress sync.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

  • Endpoint: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
  • Action: wpsfn_run_sync (inferred action name for triggering a sync) or wpsfn_save_settings.
  • Required Authentication: Authenticated user with Contributor role or higher.
  • Parameters:
    • action: wpsfn_run_sync
    • nonce: A valid nonce for the wpsfn_nonce action.
    • id: The ID of the Notion connection/sync to trigger (inferred).
  • Preconditions: At least one Notion sync connection must be configured by an administrator.

3. Code Flow (Inferred)

  1. Registration: In includes/class-wp-sync-for-notion.php or admin/class-wp-sync-for-notion-admin.php, the plugin registers the AJAX hook:
    add_action( 'wp_ajax_wpsfn_run_sync', array( $this, 'run_sync' ) );
  2. Entry Point: A Contributor user sends a POST request to admin-ajax.php with action=wpsfn_run_sync.
  3. Nonce Verification: The handler run_sync() calls:
    check_ajax_referer( 'wpsfn_nonce', 'nonce' ); (Success, as the Contributor can obtain this nonce).
  4. Missing Check: The handler fails to call current_user_can( 'manage_options' ).
  5. Execution: The handler proceeds to initiate the sync process:
    $sync_manager = new WP_Sync_For_Notion_Sync_Manager( $_POST['id'] );
    $sync_manager->run();

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

The plugin localizes the nonce for its administrative scripts. Since any user with the Contributor role can access the WordPress admin dashboard (/wp-admin/), they can extract the nonce from the global JavaScript objects initialized by the plugin.

  1. Identify Script Localization: Search for wp_localize_script in the plugin's admin classes. It is likely localized under the handle wpsfn_admin or wpsfn_ajax.
  2. Access Admin Dashboard: Navigate to /wp-admin/index.php as a Contributor.
  3. Extract via Browser: Use browser_eval to retrieve the nonce.
    • Target Variable: window.wpsfn_admin?.nonce or window.wpsfn_ajax?.nonce (inferred).
    • Alternative: View the page source and look for var wpsfn_admin = {"nonce":"..."}.

5. Exploitation Strategy

  1. Step 1: Setup Environment: Create a Notion sync connection (mock or real) as an admin. Identify its ID (usually an integer).
  2. Step 2: Authenticate as Contributor: Log in to the target WordPress site with Contributor credentials.
  3. Step 3: Extract Nonce:
    • Use browser_navigate to /wp-admin/.
    • Use browser_eval to get the nonce: browser_eval("wpsfn_admin.nonce").
  4. Step 4: Trigger Unauthorized Action: Send a POST request to admin-ajax.php using the http_request tool.

Example Request:

POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

action=wpsfn_run_sync&nonce=[EXTRACTED_NONCE]&id=1

6. Test Data Setup

  1. Plugin Installation: Install wp-sync-for-notion version 1.7.0.
  2. Admin Setup:
    • Create a dummy "Connection" in the plugin settings.
    • Note the id of this connection (check the URL in the admin panel or the database table wp_wpsfn_connections).
  3. Attacker Setup:
    • Create a user with the username attacker and role contributor.

7. Expected Results

  • Success: The server returns a 200 OK response, likely with a JSON body: {"success": true}.
  • Side Effect: The plugin initiates a sync process. Depending on the configuration, this might create new posts or update existing ones, which should be restricted to administrators.
  • Failure (Patched): The server returns a 403 Forbidden or 0 if the capability check is added.

8. Verification Steps

  1. Check Sync Status: After the exploit, use WP-CLI to check the sync logs or last sync timestamp:
    wp option get wpsfn_last_sync_1 (inferred option name).
  2. Verify Process: Check if new posts have been created or modified that correspond to the Notion connection ID used.
  3. Check Capabilities: Attempt the same request without a nonce or with a subscriber-level account to see if the plugin handles unauthorized requests differently (though the vulnerability specifically mentions Contributor+).

9. Alternative Approaches

  • Action Guessing: If wpsfn_run_sync is not the correct action name, grep the source code for add_action( 'wp_ajax_ to find all available administrative AJAX endpoints.
  • Settings Modification: Check if wpsfn_save_settings or wpsfn_update_connection are also registered without authorization checks. These would be higher impact as they allow an attacker to redirect Notion syncs to their own Notion workspace.
  • Parameter Variation: If id is not the correct parameter for the connection, check the run_sync function signature for $_POST or $_REQUEST keys.
Research Findings
Static analysis — not yet PoC-verified

Summary

The WP Sync for Notion plugin for WordPress (<= 1.7.0) fails to perform capability checks on several AJAX handlers, such as those used to trigger synchronizations or save settings. This allows authenticated users with Contributor-level access or higher to perform administrative actions by leveraging nonces accessible through the WordPress admin dashboard.

Vulnerable Code

// File: admin/class-wp-sync-for-notion-admin.php (inferred)

public function run_sync() {
    // Nonce verification is present, but anyone with access to /wp-admin can obtain it
    check_ajax_referer( 'wpsfn_nonce', 'nonce' );

    // MISSING: current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) check here

    $connection_id = isset( $_POST['id'] ) ? intval( $_POST['id'] ) : 0;
    if ( $connection_id ) {
        $sync_manager = new WP_Sync_For_Notion_Sync_Manager( $connection_id );
        $sync_manager->run();
        wp_send_json_success();
    }
    wp_send_json_error();
}

Security Fix

--- a/admin/class-wp-sync-for-notion-admin.php
+++ b/admin/class-wp-sync-for-notion-admin.php
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
     public function run_sync() {
         check_ajax_referer( 'wpsfn_nonce', 'nonce' );
 
+        if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
+            wp_send_json_error( array( 'message' => __( 'You do not have permission to perform this action.', 'wp-sync-for-notion' ) ), 403 );
+        }
+
         $connection_id = isset( $_POST['id'] ) ? intval( $_POST['id'] ) : 0;
         if ( $connection_id ) {
             $sync_manager = new WP_Sync_For_Notion_Sync_Manager( $connection_id );

Exploit Outline

The exploit involves a Contributor-level user accessing the WordPress dashboard to retrieve a valid AJAX nonce and then triggering a sync action. 1. **Authentication**: Authenticate as a user with at least Contributor permissions. 2. **Nonce Retrieval**: Navigate to the WordPress admin area (`/wp-admin/`) and extract the `wpsfn_nonce` value from the localized JavaScript variables (typically found in the HTML source under a script tag containing `wpsfn_admin` or similar global objects). 3. **Target Identification**: Identify a valid Connection ID for a Notion sync (e.g., `id=1`). 4. **Action Execution**: Send a POST request to `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php` with the parameters: `action=wpsfn_run_sync`, `nonce=[EXTRACTED_NONCE]`, and `id=[CONNECTION_ID]`. 5. **Result**: The server will process the synchronization request despite the user lacking administrative privileges, because the handler only checks for a valid nonce and not for appropriate user capabilities.

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