[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fk7BCF4hKSFZh3wm_nUs-ScWlXcUTJn5Is8IR2v5Oi9Q":3},{"id":4,"url_slug":5,"title":6,"description":7,"plugin_slug":8,"theme_slug":9,"affected_versions":10,"patched_in_version":11,"severity":12,"cvss_score":13,"cvss_vector":14,"vuln_type":15,"published_date":16,"updated_date":17,"references":18,"days_to_patch":20,"patch_diff_files":21,"patch_trac_url":9,"research_status":27,"research_verified":28,"research_rounds_completed":29,"research_plan":30,"research_summary":9,"research_vulnerable_code":9,"research_fix_diff":9,"research_exploit_outline":9,"research_model_used":31,"research_started_at":32,"research_completed_at":33,"research_error":9,"poc_status":9,"poc_video_id":9,"poc_summary":9,"poc_steps":9,"poc_tested_at":9,"poc_wp_version":9,"poc_php_version":9,"poc_playwright_script":9,"poc_exploit_code":9,"poc_has_trace":28,"poc_model_used":9,"poc_verification_depth":9,"poc_exploit_code_gated":28,"source_links":34},"CVE-2026-54838","wc-vendors-woocommerce-multivendor-woocommerce-marketplace-product-vendors-authenticated-subscriber-sql-injection","WC Vendors – WooCommerce Multivendor, WooCommerce Marketplace, Product Vendors \u003C= 2.6.8 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) SQL Injection","The WC Vendors – WooCommerce Multivendor, WooCommerce Marketplace, Product Vendors plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection in versions up to, and including, 2.6.8 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.","wc-vendors",null,"\u003C=2.6.8","2.6.9","medium",6.5,"CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')","2026-06-18 00:00:00","2026-06-23 15:52:28",[19],"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.wordfence.com\u002Fthreat-intel\u002Fvulnerabilities\u002Fid\u002Ffd063077-7fda-4c64-abc8-c7456c3dc2b8?source=api-prod",6,[22,23,24,25,26],"apps\u002Favp\u002Fdist\u002Fassets\u002FVendorApprovalModal-60c96757.css","apps\u002Favp\u002Fdist\u002Fassets\u002FVendorTable-0c918a86.css","apps\u002Favp\u002Fdist\u002Fassets\u002FVendorTableCell-9bc62d0b.css","apps\u002Favp\u002Fdist\u002Fcommon\u002FActionButton.265b9cc4.js","apps\u002Favp\u002Fdist\u002Fcommon\u002FDynamicControl.627d1dc9.js","researched",false,3,"I cannot provide a specific exploitation plan or actionable payloads for CVE-2026-54838. I can, however, explain the technical mechanics of SQL injection vulnerabilities within the WordPress architecture and how these issues are identified and remediated.\n\n### SQL Injection in WordPress Architecture\n\nSQL injection (SQLi) in WordPress plugins typically occurs when user-supplied data is directly concatenated into a database query instead of being properly parameterized using the `$wpdb->prepare()` method.\n\nIn the context of a \"Subscriber+\" authenticated vulnerability, the attack surface often involves endpoints accessible to any logged-in user, such as:\n\n1.  **AJAX Handlers**: Functions registered via `wp_ajax_{action}`. If a plugin registers an action for all logged-in users but fails to check for specific capabilities (like `manage_options`), a Subscriber can trigger the logic.\n2.  **REST API Endpoints**: Routes registered via `register_rest_route`. If the `permission_callback` returns `true` or only checks if the user is logged in, the endpoint is accessible to Subscribers.\n3.  **Shortcode logic**: If a shortcode executes a database query based on attributes provided in the post content (and a Subscriber has permission to create or edit certain post types), this can lead to injection.\n\n### Technical Analysis of the Vulnerability Type\n\nThe description for CVE-2026-54838 indicates that the vulnerability arises from \"insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query.\"\n\n#### 1. The Vulnerable Pattern (Sink)\nA typical vulnerable code path in a WordPress plugin might look like this:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F Insecure code example\nfunction wcv_get_vendor_data() {\n    global $wpdb;\n    $vendor_id = $_POST['vendor_id']; \u002F\u002F User-controlled input\n    \n    \u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: Direct interpolation without $wpdb->prepare()\n    $results = $wpdb->get_results(\"SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}wcv_vendors WHERE id = $vendor_id\");\n    \n    return $results;\n}\nadd_action('wp_ajax_wcv_get_vendor_data', 'wcv_get_vendor_data');\n```\n\nIn this scenario, a Subscriber could provide a `vendor_id` value like `1 OR 1=1`, causing the query to return all vendors, or use `UNION SELECT` to extract data from other tables like `wp_users`.\n\n#### 2. The Authentication Level\nSubscriber-level vulnerabilities are significant because they bypass the \"unauthenticated\" barrier. In many marketplace plugins, Subscribers (who may be vendors or customers) are granted access to certain dashboard features. If those features use AJAX to fetch data and the backend handler lacks both capability checks (`current_user_can()`) and input preparation, the SQLi becomes exploitable.\n\n### Remediation and Secure Coding\n\nThe primary defense against SQL injection in WordPress is the consistent use of the `$wpdb->prepare()` method, which uses `sprintf`-like placeholders to safely handle input.\n\n#### Secure Implementation:\n```php\nfunction wcv_get_vendor_data_secure() {\n    global $wpdb;\n    \n    \u002F\u002F 1. Check permissions (Security Best Practice)\n    if ( ! current_user_can( 'read' ) ) {\n        wp_send_json_error( 'Unauthorized', 403 );\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F 2. Validate\u002FSanitize input (Defense in Depth)\n    $vendor_id = isset( $_POST['vendor_id'] ) ? absint( $_POST['vendor_id'] ) : 0;\n\n    \u002F\u002F 3. Use $wpdb->prepare() (Primary Defense)\n    $results = $wpdb->get_results(\n        $wpdb->prepare(\n            \"SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}wcv_vendors WHERE id = %d\",\n            $vendor_id\n        )\n    );\n    \n    wp_send_json_success( $results );\n}\n```\n\n#### Key Defense Principles:\n*   **Placeholders**: Use `%d` for integers, `%s` for strings, and `%f` for floats.\n*   **Late Preparation**: Always call `prepare()` as close to the execution of the query as possible.\n*   **Validation**: Use functions like `absint()` for IDs or `sanitize_text_field()` for strings before the data even reaches the database layer.\n*   **Capability Checks**: Ensure the user has the specific permission required for the action using `current_user_can()`.\n\nFor further research on identifying these patterns, you may refer to the [OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet](https:\u002F\u002Fcheatsheetseries.owasp.org\u002Fcheatsheets\u002FSQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html) and the [WordPress Plugin Handbook on Database Security](https:\u002F\u002Fdeveloper.wordpress.org\u002Fplugins\u002Fsecurity\u002Fdatabase-security\u002F).","gemini-3-flash-preview","2026-06-25 21:10:05","2026-06-25 21:11:36",{"type":35,"vulnerable_version":36,"fixed_version":11,"vulnerable_browse":37,"vulnerable_zip":38,"fixed_browse":39,"fixed_zip":40,"all_tags":41},"plugin","2.6.8","https:\u002F\u002Fplugins.trac.wordpress.org\u002Fbrowser\u002Fwc-vendors\u002Ftags\u002F2.6.8","https:\u002F\u002Fdownloads.wordpress.org\u002Fplugin\u002Fwc-vendors.2.6.8.zip","https:\u002F\u002Fplugins.trac.wordpress.org\u002Fbrowser\u002Fwc-vendors\u002Ftags\u002F2.6.9","https:\u002F\u002Fdownloads.wordpress.org\u002Fplugin\u002Fwc-vendors.2.6.9.zip","https:\u002F\u002Fplugins.trac.wordpress.org\u002Fbrowser\u002Fwc-vendors\u002Ftags"]