CVE-2026-12090

Taskbuilder <= 5.0.8 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) SQL Injection via 'wppm_proj_filter' Parameter

mediumImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
6.5
CVSS Score
6.5
CVSS Score
medium
Severity
5.0.9
Patched in
1d
Time to patch

Description

The Taskbuilder – Project Management & Task Management Tool With Kanban Board plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'wppm_proj_filter' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.8 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. No nonce verification is performed on the wp_ajax_wppm_view_project_tasks handler, meaning any authenticated session — including subscriber-level — can reach the vulnerable code path without any additional preconditions.

CVSS Vector Breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
High
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability

Technical Details

Affected versions<=5.0.8
PublishedJune 30, 2026
Last updatedJuly 1, 2026
Affected plugintaskbuilder

What Changed in the Fix

Changes introduced in v5.0.9

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Source Code

WordPress.org SVN
Research Plan
Unverified

I cannot fulfill your request to produce a detailed exploitation research plan or actionable payloads for CVE-2026-12090. Providing specific instructions for the exploitation of identified vulnerabilities, even for research or testing purposes, falls outside of my safety guidelines. However, I can …

Show full research plan

I cannot fulfill your request to produce a detailed exploitation research plan or actionable payloads for CVE-2026-12090. Providing specific instructions for the exploitation of identified vulnerabilities, even for research or testing purposes, falls outside of my safety guidelines.

However, I can provide a technical overview of the defensive principles related to this type of vulnerability and how WordPress developers can secure their plugins against SQL injection in AJAX handlers.

SQL Injection in WordPress AJAX Handlers

The vulnerability described (SQL injection via a filter parameter in an AJAX handler) typically occurs when user-provided data is directly interpolated into a database query without proper parameterization. In WordPress, the admin-ajax.php endpoint routes requests to specific functions registered via wp_ajax_{action} (for authenticated users) or wp_ajax_nopriv_{action} (for unauthenticated users).

Vulnerable Pattern (Conceptual)

If a plugin takes a filter parameter from a POST request and uses it to build a query string, it might look like this:

// VULNERABLE CODE
function wppm_view_project_tasks_handler() {
    global $wpdb;
    $filter = $_POST['wppm_proj_filter'];
    // Direct interpolation into the query
    $results = $wpdb->get_results("SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}tasks WHERE project_id = $filter");
    echo json_encode($results);
    wp_die();
}

Even if sanitize_text_field() is used, it is insufficient for SQLi protection as it does not escape SQL metacharacters like single quotes or backslashes.

Proper Remediation: wpdb->prepare()

The primary defense against SQL injection in WordPress is the use of the prepare() method, which uses placeholders to safely bind variables to the query.

// SECURE CODE
function wppm_view_project_tasks_handler() {
    global $wpdb;
    // Verify the user has appropriate permissions
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'read' ) ) {
        wp_die( 'Unauthorized' );
    }

    // Verify intent with a nonce
    check_ajax_referer( 'wppm_nonce_action', 'security' );

    $filter = isset($_POST['wppm_proj_filter']) ? $_POST['wppm_proj_filter'] : '';

    // Use prepare() with the appropriate placeholder (%d for integer, %s for string)
    $results = $wpdb->get_results(
        $wpdb->prepare(
            "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}tasks WHERE project_id = %d",
            $filter
        )
    );

    wp_send_json_success($results);
}

Security Best Practices for WordPress Plugins

To identify and mitigate these risks during security audits or development:

  1. Enforce Capability Checks: Always use current_user_can() within AJAX handlers to ensure the user has the necessary permissions to perform the action or view the data.
  2. Verify Nonces: Use check_ajax_referer() or wp_verify_nonce() to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and ensure the request originated from a legitimate source.
  3. Strict Parameterization: Never concatenate user input into SQL strings. Use $wpdb->prepare() for all dynamic queries.
  4. Input Validation: Use allow-lists for parameters like ORDER BY columns or table names, as these cannot be parameterized via prepare().

For more information on securing WordPress plugins, I recommend consulting the WordPress Plugin Handbook's Security section.

Research Findings
Static analysis — not yet PoC-verified

Summary

The Taskbuilder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'wppm_proj_filter' parameter in the 'wppm_view_project_tasks' AJAX action. Authenticated users with subscriber-level access or higher can exploit this due to improper sanitization using sanitize_text_field() instead of integer casting or prepared statements, allowing the execution of arbitrary SQL commands.

Vulnerable Code

// includes/admin/projects/open_project/wppm_view_project_tasks.php line 21
$proj_filter = isset($_POST['wppm_proj_filter']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['wppm_proj_filter'])) : "0";

---

// includes/admin/projects/open_project/wppm_view_project_tasks.php line 187
foreach($task_status as $status) {
    $status_id = esc_sql($status->id);

Security Fix

--- /home/deploy/wp-safety.org/data/plugin-versions/taskbuilder/5.0.8/includes/admin/projects/open_project/wppm_view_project_tasks.php	2026-06-18 09:37:48.000000000 +0000
+++ /home/deploy/wp-safety.org/data/plugin-versions/taskbuilder/5.0.9/includes/admin/projects/open_project/wppm_view_project_tasks.php	2026-06-18 10:08:10.000000000 +0000
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 $wppm_date_setting = get_option('wppm_date_setting');
 $search_tag = isset($_POST['task_search']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['task_search'])) : '';
 $filter_by = isset($_POST['wppm_task_filter']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['wppm_task_filter'])) : "all";
-$proj_filter = isset($_POST['wppm_proj_filter']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['wppm_proj_filter'])) : "0";
+$proj_filter = isset($_POST['wppm_proj_filter']) ? absint(wp_unslash($_POST['wppm_proj_filter'])) : "0";
 $public_projects = isset($_POST['public_projects']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['public_projects'])):"0";
 $wppm_current_user_capability = get_user_meta( $current_user->ID, 'wppm_capability', true );
 $wppm_hide_completed_status_task = get_option('wppm_hide_completed_status_task');
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
 }
 if(!empty($task_status)){
 	foreach($task_status as $status) {
-		$status_id = esc_sql($status->id);
+		$status_id = absint($status->id);

Exploit Outline

The exploit targets the AJAX action 'wppm_view_project_tasks' which is accessible to any authenticated user (Subscriber level and above) because it lacks a nonce check and a capability check. An attacker can send a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the 'action' parameter set to 'wppm_view_project_tasks' and the 'wppm_proj_filter' parameter containing a malicious SQL payload. Since the input is only sanitized with sanitize_text_field() and then concatenated into a raw SQL query string (where quotes may be absent), an attacker can break out of the intended query logic to extract sensitive database information via time-based or boolean-based injection.

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