Stop Spammers Classic <= 2026.1 - Cross-Site Request Forgery via Email Allowlist
Description
The Stop Spammers Classic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 2026.1. This is due to missing nonce validation in the ss_addtoallowlist class. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to add arbitrary email addresses to the spam allowlist via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. The vulnerability was partially patched in version 2026.1.
CVSS Vector Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NTechnical Details
<=2026.1This research plan outlines the steps to verify and exploit **CVE-2025-14795**, a CSRF vulnerability in the **Stop Spammers Classic** plugin. --- ### 1. Vulnerability Summary * **Vulnerability:** Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) * **Class/Component:** `ss_addtoallowlist` (inferred from CVE de…
Show full research plan
This research plan outlines the steps to verify and exploit CVE-2025-14795, a CSRF vulnerability in the Stop Spammers Classic plugin.
1. Vulnerability Summary
- Vulnerability: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Class/Component:
ss_addtoallowlist(inferred from CVE description) - Root Cause: The class responsible for adding email addresses to the spam allowlist does not implement nonce validation (e.g.,
check_admin_refererorcheck_ajax_referer). This allows an attacker to trick a logged-in administrator into adding any email address to the plugin's allowlist, effectively bypassing spam protections for those addresses. - Affected Versions: <= 2026.1
- Patch: Version 2026.2 adds nonce checks to the processing logic.
2. Attack Vector Analysis
- Endpoint: Admin Dashboard (
/wp-admin/admin.php) - Action/Page: The vulnerability resides in the logic that handles the "Add to Allowlist" action, likely triggered via the
stop-spammerssettings page or log entries. - HTTP Method: Likely
GETorPOST. (Historically, this plugin has usedGETparameters for quick allowlist actions from the log page). - Payload Parameter:
ss_add_to_allow_listoradd_allow(inferred). - Authentication: Requires a victim with
manage_optionscapabilities (Administrator). - Preconditions: The plugin must be active.
3. Code Flow (Inferred)
- Hook Registration: The plugin registers an
admin_initoradmin_menuhook that instantiates thess_addtoallowlistclass. - Request Detection: In the class constructor or a processing method (e.g.,
process()), the code checks for the presence of a specific request parameter (e.g.,$_GET['ss_add_to_allow_list']). - Processing (SINK): If the parameter exists, the code calls
get_option('ss_stop_spammers_settings'), appends the new email to the allowlist array, and saves it usingupdate_option(). - Vulnerability: Between step 2 and 3, there is no call to
check_admin_referer(), allowing requests to originate from external domains.
4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy
According to the vulnerability description, the ss_addtoallowlist class completely misses nonce validation.
- Conclusion: No nonce is required to exploit this vulnerability in the affected versions. The exploit can be triggered via a direct request.
5. Exploitation Strategy
The goal is to simulate a CSRF attack where an administrator's browser is forced to send a request that adds attacker@evil.com to the allowlist.
Step-by-Step Plan:
- Identification: Use the agent to search for the class file (likely
classes/ss_addtoallowlist.phpor similar) to identify the exact parameter name. - Request Formulation: Construct an HTTP request to
wp-admin/admin.phpwith the necessary parameters. - Simulation: Use the
http_requesttool with the administrator's cookies to simulate the hijacked session.
Draft Payload (Example - using inferred parameters):
- URL:
http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php - Method:
GET - Query Params:
page:stop-spammers(or the relevant sub-page slug)ss_add_to_allow_list:attacker@evil.com
HTTP Request Execution:
// Using http_request via the agent
await http_request({
url: "http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php?page=stop-spammers&ss_add_to_allow_list=attacker@evil.com",
method: "GET",
follow_redirects: true
});
6. Test Data Setup
- Install Plugin: Install Stop Spammers Classic version 2026.1.
- Active Session: Ensure the agent is operating with a user that has
administratorprivileges. - Initial State: Confirm that
attacker@evil.comis NOT currently in the allowlist.
7. Expected Results
- HTTP Response: A 200 OK or 302 Redirect (if the plugin redirects back to the settings page).
- Behavior: The plugin's internal settings for the "Email Allowlist" (often stored in the
ss_stop_spammers_settingsoption) should now includeattacker@evil.com.
8. Verification Steps
After sending the request, use wp-cli to verify the state of the database:
# Get the current settings option
wp option get ss_stop_spammers_settings
# Check if the allowlist array/string contains the target email
# Note: The structure might be a serialized array.
wp option get ss_stop_spammers_settings --format=json | grep "attacker@evil.com"
9. Alternative Approaches
If a simple GET request fails:
- Check for POST: Analyze the source code to see if the logic requires
$_POST. If so, usehttp_requestwithmethod: "POST"andbody: "ss_add_to_allow_list=attacker@evil.com&action=...". - Check for Admin-Ajax: Some versions of this plugin might route requests through
admin-ajax.php. Search the code forwp_ajax_ss_add_to_allow_list. - Verify Parameter Name: If
ss_add_to_allow_listis incorrect, search the source forupdate_optioncalls withinss_addtoallowlist.phpto find what variable is being saved. Look for:
This will reveal the option name and the surrounding logic for user input.grep -rn "update_option" wp-content/plugins/stop-spammer-registrations-plugin/
Summary
The Stop Spammers Classic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in versions up to and including 2026.1. This is due to missing nonce validation in the ss_addtoallowlist class, which allows unauthenticated attackers to add arbitrary email addresses to the spam allowlist by tricking an administrator into clicking a malicious link.
Vulnerable Code
// Inferred from research plan: logic in ss_addtoallowlist class processing user-supplied email // File: classes/ss_addtoallowlist.php if (isset($_GET['ss_add_to_allow_list'])) { $email = $_GET['ss_add_to_allow_list']; $settings = get_option('ss_stop_spammers_settings'); // Email added to allowlist without nonce check or capability verification $settings['wlist_email'][] = $email; update_option('ss_stop_spammers_settings', $settings); }
Security Fix
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ public function process() { if (isset($_GET['ss_add_to_allow_list'])) { + check_admin_referer('ss_add_to_allow_list_action'); + if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) { wp_die('Unauthorized'); } $email = sanitize_email($_GET['ss_add_to_allow_list']); $settings = get_option('ss_stop_spammers_settings');
Exploit Outline
An attacker construction a malicious URL targeting the WordPress admin dashboard (e.g., /wp-admin/admin.php?page=stop-spammers&ss_add_to_allow_list=evil@attacker.com). The attacker then uses social engineering to trick a site administrator into clicking this link while authenticated. Because the plugin does not verify the request's origin via a nonce, the administrator's browser executes the request with valid session cookies, causing the plugin to add the attacker's email to the allowlist and granting it immunity from spam filtering.
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