CVE-2026-5693

Smart Appointment & Booking <= 1.0.8 - Missing Authorization to Unauthenticated Arbitrary Booking Cancellation

mediumMissing Authorization
5.3
CVSS Score
5.3
CVSS Score
medium
Severity
Unpatched
Patched in
N/A
Time to patch

Description

The Smart Appointment & Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check and a nonce validation logic flaw in the saab_cancel_booking() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.8. The nonce check uses && (AND) instead of || (OR), which means providing any value for the security parameter causes the entire check to be skipped. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to cancel arbitrary bookings by supplying a predictable booking ID.

CVSS Vector Breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
None
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability

Technical Details

Affected versions<=1.0.8
PublishedMay 11, 2026
Last updatedMay 12, 2026
Research Plan
Unverified

# Exploitation Research Plan: CVE-2026-5693 (Smart Appointment & Booking) ## 1. Vulnerability Summary The **Smart Appointment & Booking** plugin (<= 1.0.8) contains a logic flaw in its booking cancellation routine. The function `saab_cancel_booking()` is intended to allow users (potentially unauthe…

Show full research plan

Exploitation Research Plan: CVE-2026-5693 (Smart Appointment & Booking)

1. Vulnerability Summary

The Smart Appointment & Booking plugin (<= 1.0.8) contains a logic flaw in its booking cancellation routine. The function saab_cancel_booking() is intended to allow users (potentially unauthenticated ones) to cancel their bookings. However, it fails to perform a capability check to ensure the requester has authority over the specific booking ID. Furthermore, the nonce validation logic is fundamentally broken: it uses the && (AND) operator in a way that allows the check to be bypassed by simply providing any value for the security parameter. This enables an unauthenticated attacker to cancel any booking in the system by guessing or enumerating booking IDs.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

  • Endpoint: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
  • AJAX Action: saab_cancel_booking (associated with both wp_ajax_ and wp_ajax_nopriv_ hooks).
  • HTTP Method: POST
  • Vulnerable Parameter: booking_id
  • Bypass Parameter: security (the nonce parameter)
  • Authentication: Unauthenticated (No login required).
  • Preconditions: A booking must exist in the system.

3. Code Flow

The vulnerability originates from the registration of the AJAX handler and the logic within the handler function:

  1. Hook Registration (inferred):
    add_action( 'wp_ajax_saab_cancel_booking', 'saab_cancel_booking' );
    add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_saab_cancel_booking', 'saab_cancel_booking' );
    
  2. Vulnerable Function Execution:
    The saab_cancel_booking() function is called.
  3. Logic Flaw (Grounding in Description):
    The function likely contains a check similar to:
    if ( ! isset( $_POST['security'] ) && ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['security'], 'saab_cancel_booking_nonce' ) ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid nonce' );
    }
    
    Because && is used, if $_POST['security'] is provided, the first condition ! isset( $_POST['security'] ) evaluates to false. In an AND operation, if the first operand is false, the entire expression is false. Thus, the "Invalid nonce" block is skipped entirely, regardless of whether the nonce is valid.
  4. Action Performance:
    The code proceeds to update the database for the provided booking_id (likely changing a status column to 'cancelled' or similar) without verifying if the current requester "owns" that booking.

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

Due to the logic flaw, no valid nonce is required.

  • Bypass Mechanism: Simply include the security parameter with any arbitrary value (e.g., security=12345).
  • Strategy: The exploit will provide a dummy value for the security parameter to satisfy the isset() check and trigger the short-circuiting logic error.

5. Exploitation Strategy

The goal is to cancel a booking by ID without authentication.

  1. Target Identification: Identify a valid booking_id. Since these are typically auto-incrementing integers in the database, they are easily enumerable.
  2. Request Formulation: Construct a POST request to admin-ajax.php.

HTTP Request (via http_request):

POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
Host: [TARGET_HOST]
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

action=saab_cancel_booking&booking_id=1&security=bypass
  • action: saab_cancel_booking
  • booking_id: The integer ID of the booking to target.
  • security: Any non-empty string.

6. Test Data Setup

To verify the exploit in a controlled environment:

  1. Install Plugin: Ensure smart-appointment-booking version 1.0.8 or lower is active.
  2. Create Booking: Use the plugin's frontend booking form or WP-CLI to create a dummy booking.
    # Note: If no CLI command exists for this plugin, use the UI or direct DB insert
    # Example (inferred table name):
    wp db query "INSERT INTO wp_saab_bookings (status, user_id) VALUES ('pending', 1);"
    
  3. Verify Initial State: Record the id and current status of the created booking.

7. Expected Results

  • Server Response: The AJAX handler should return a successful JSON response, such as {"success":true} or a specific success message.
  • Database Change: The record in the bookings table corresponding to the booking_id will have its status updated (e.g., from pending or confirmed to cancelled).

8. Verification Steps

After sending the exploitation request, use WP-CLI to check the database state:

  1. Query Booking Status:
    # Replace 'wp_saab_bookings' with the actual table name used by the plugin
    wp db query "SELECT status FROM wp_saab_bookings WHERE id = 1;"
    
  2. Comparison: Confirm the status has changed to the value representing a cancellation (usually 'cancelled' or a numeric code like '0').

9. Alternative Approaches

If the security parameter name or the action name differs slightly:

  • Identify Correct Action: Use grep -r "wp_ajax_nopriv" . in the plugin directory to find the exact unauthenticated AJAX action name.
  • Identify Correct Parameters: Grep for $_POST or $_REQUEST inside the saab_cancel_booking() function body to confirm the parameter names for the ID and the nonce/security check.
  • Enumeration: If the booking ID is not 1, iterate through a small range (1-20) to find a valid target record.
Research Findings
Static analysis — not yet PoC-verified

Summary

The Smart Appointment & Booking plugin (<= 1.0.8) contains a logic flaw in its booking cancellation routine where an incorrect logical operator (&& instead of ||) allows nonce validation to be bypassed. Because the AJAX handler is registered for unauthenticated users and lacks ownership checks, an attacker can cancel any booking by providing its ID and an arbitrary security parameter value.

Vulnerable Code

// Inferred from plugin logic within saab_cancel_booking function

add_action( 'wp_ajax_saab_cancel_booking', 'saab_cancel_booking' );
add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_saab_cancel_booking', 'saab_cancel_booking' );

function saab_cancel_booking() {
    // Logic flaw: if $_POST['security'] is provided, !isset evaluates to false.
    // In an AND (&&) expression, if the first part is false, the whole check is skipped.
    if ( ! isset( $_POST['security'] ) && ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['security'], 'saab_cancel_booking_nonce' ) ) {
        wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid security token' );
    }

    $booking_id = intval( $_POST['booking_id'] );

    // Missing authorization check: no verification that the requester owns this booking ID
    global $wpdb;
    $wpdb->update(
        $wpdb->prefix . 'saab_bookings',
        array( 'status' => 'cancelled' ),
        array( 'id' => $booking_id )
    );

    wp_send_json_success( 'Booking cancelled' );
}

Security Fix

--- a/includes/class-saab-ajax.php
+++ b/includes/class-saab-ajax.php
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 function saab_cancel_booking() {
-    if ( ! isset( $_POST['security'] ) && ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['security'], 'saab_cancel_booking_nonce' ) ) {
+    if ( ! isset( $_POST['security'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['security'], 'saab_cancel_booking_nonce' ) ) {
         wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid security token' );
     }
 
     $booking_id = intval( $_POST['booking_id'] );
+    // Additionally, implement checks to ensure the current user is authorized to modify this booking_id

Exploit Outline

The exploit targets the unauthenticated AJAX endpoint 'saab_cancel_booking'. An attacker sends a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the 'action' set to 'saab_cancel_booking'. By including a 'security' parameter with any non-empty value (e.g., 'security=123'), the attacker triggers a logic flaw where the '&&' operator short-circuits, causing the plugin to skip nonce validation entirely. Since there is no secondary check to verify if the requester owns the booking, the attacker can supply any 'booking_id' to cancel records across the database.

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