Image Slider by Ays- Responsive Slider and Carousel <= 2.7.0 - Cross-Site Request Forgery to Arbitrary Slider Deletion

This research plan outlines the steps to analyze and exploit CVE-2025-14454, a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the Image Slider by Ays plugin.

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1. Vulnerability Summary

The Image Slider by Ays plugin (up to version 2.7.0) fails to perform adequate nonce validation when processing bulk slider deletions. This lack of CSRF protection allows an attacker to craft a malicious request that, if executed by a logged-in administrator (e.g., via a phishing link), results in the permanent deletion of arbitrary sliders from the WordPress database.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

• Vulnerable Endpoint: wp-admin/admin.php (or potentially wp-admin/admin-post.php depending on the handler registration).
• Action: Likely a bulk action identifier such as delete, ays_slider_bulk_delete, or similar (inferred).
• HTTP Method: POST (typically used for bulk actions in the WordPress admin list table).
• Payload Parameter: ays_slider_ids[] or ids[] containing the IDs of the sliders to be deleted (inferred).
• Authentication: Requires an active Administrator session (CSRF context).
• Preconditions: At least one slider must exist for the deletion to be observable.

3. Code Flow (Inferred)

1. The administrator views the slider list page: /wp-admin/admin.php?page=ays-slider-sliders.
2. The plugin registers an admin-side handler (likely via admin_init or within the class handling the list table).
3. When a "Bulk Delete" action is triggered, the code checks the $_POST['action'] or $_POST['action2'] parameter.
4. The Vulnerability: The handler proceeds to call a deletion function (e.g., $wpdb->delete) on the provided IDs without first calling check_admin_referer() or verifying a nonce via wp_verify_nonce().
5. The slider records are removed from the {wp_prefix}_ays_slider_sliders table (inferred table name).

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

According to the vulnerability description, nonce validation is missing or incorrect.

• If missing: No nonce is required in the payload.
• If incorrect/bypassed: The plugin might check for a nonce only if it is present in the request.
• Verification: The PoC agent should first attempt the deletion without a nonce. If that fails, it should attempt it with an invalid nonce (e.g., _wpnonce=1234567890).

Note: Since this is a CSRF, the "acquisition" in a real attack is not necessary; the attacker simply omits it. For the PoC agent to prove the vulnerability, it will simulate the administrator's request.

5. Exploitation Strategy

The goal is to demonstrate that a POST request can delete a slider without a valid nonce.

Step-by-Step Plan:

1. Identify IDs: Create two sliders to have known targets.
2. Identify Endpoint: Navigate to the slider list page as an admin and inspect the bulk action form.
3. Draft Payload:
   • URL: http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin.php?page=ays-slider-sliders (or the identified handler URL).
   • Method: POST
   • Body (URL-Encoded):

     action=delete&ays_slider_ids[]=1&ays_slider_ids[]=2
     

     (Note: The exact action string and ays_slider_ids key must be verified during the "Test Data Setup" phase by inspecting the HTML of the admin page).
4. Execute via http_request: Send the request using the administrator's session cookies but omitting the _wpnonce field.

6. Test Data Setup

To ensure a successful and verifiable PoC:

1. Create Sliders: Use WP-CLI to ensure the database is populated.

   # Since we don't have a direct WP-CLI command for this plugin, 
   # we can use wp eval to insert into the custom table.
   wp eval "global \$wpdb; \$wpdb->insert(\"{\$wpdb->prefix}ays_slider_sliders\", ['title' => 'Exploit Test 1']);"
   wp eval "global \$wpdb; \$wpdb->insert(\"{\$wpdb->prefix}ays_slider_sliders\", ['title' => 'Exploit Test 2']);"
   

2. Verify Table Name: If the command above fails, use wp db tables to find the correct table name (likely wp_ays_slider_sliders).
3. Capture IDs:

   wp db query "SELECT id, title FROM wp_ays_slider_sliders"
   

7. Expected Results

• The http_request should return a 302 Found (redirecting back to the list page) or a 200 OK.
• The sliders with the targeted IDs should no longer exist in the database.

8. Verification Steps

After sending the malicious POST request, confirm the deletion via WP-CLI:

# Check if the count of sliders has decreased
wp db query "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM wp_ays_slider_sliders"

# Specifically check for the IDs targeted in the exploit
wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_ays_slider_sliders WHERE id IN (1, 2)"

If the query returns empty, the CSRF is confirmed.

9. Alternative Approaches

• GET-based CSRF: Check if the deletion handler accepts GET requests (e.g., wp-admin/admin.php?page=ays-slider-sliders&action=delete&id=1). This is common if the developer uses $_REQUEST instead of $_POST.
• Action2 Parameter: WordPress list tables often use action (top dropdown) and action2 (bottom dropdown). If action is protected but action2 is not, the exploit targets action2.
• Single Delete: Check for a "Delete" link next to each slider. These often link to admin.php?page=...&action=delete&id=X and are frequently missing nonce checks compared to bulk actions.