CVE-2026-1058

Form Maker by 10Web <= 1.15.35 - Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Hidden Field

highImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
7.1
CVSS Score
7.1
CVSS Score
high
Severity
1.15.36
Patched in
1d
Time to patch

Description

The Form Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via hidden field values in all versions up to, and including, 1.15.35. This is due to insufficient output escaping when displaying hidden field values in the admin submissions list. The plugin uses html_entity_decode() on user-supplied hidden field values without subsequent escaping before output, which converts HTML entity-encoded payloads back into executable JavaScript. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in the admin submissions view that will execute whenever an administrator accesses the submissions list.

CVSS Vector Breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Low
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability

Technical Details

Affected versions<=1.15.35
PublishedFebruary 2, 2026
Last updatedFebruary 3, 2026
Affected pluginform-maker

Source Code

WordPress.org SVN
Research Plan
Unverified

This research plan targets **CVE-2026-1058**, a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the "Form Maker by 10Web" plugin. The vulnerability arises because the plugin uses `html_entity_decode()` on hidden field values before displaying them in the admin submissions list, without subsequent…

Show full research plan

This research plan targets CVE-2026-1058, a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the "Form Maker by 10Web" plugin. The vulnerability arises because the plugin uses html_entity_decode() on hidden field values before displaying them in the admin submissions list, without subsequent escaping.

1. Vulnerability Summary

  • Vulnerability: Unauthenticated Stored XSS.
  • Affected Component: Admin Submissions View (Submissions list/details).
  • Root Cause: Improper output neutralization. User-supplied input for "Hidden" type fields is processed with html_entity_decode(). If an attacker submits a payload using HTML entities (e.g., &lt;script&gt;), the plugin decodes it back into executable HTML/JavaScript (<script>) and echoes it to the administrator's browser.
  • Affected Versions: <= 1.15.35.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

  • Endpoint: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
  • Action: form_maker_submit (inferred from standard Form Maker submission logic).
  • Vulnerable Parameter: The value associated with a "Hidden" field type. These are typically sent in the POST body as part of the form data (e.g., submission_data or indexed field parameters like field_1, field_2).
  • Authentication: None (Unauthenticated).
  • Preconditions: A form must exist that contains at least one "Hidden" field.

3. Code Flow

  1. Submission (Public):
    • The frontend form sends a POST request to admin-ajax.php with action=form_maker_submit (inferred).
    • The plugin receives the data and saves it to the {wp_prefix}form_maker_submits table.
  2. Processing (Admin):
    • An administrator navigates to Form Maker > Submissions.
    • The plugin fetches the submissions for the specific form.
    • The code iterates through the fields. When it encounters a field defined as type hidden, it retrieves the stored value.
    • The Sink: The plugin calls html_entity_decode($field_value) and echos the result directly into the table cell or detail view.
    • If the value was &lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;, it becomes <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> in the DOM, triggering execution.

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

Form Maker typically requires a frontend nonce for form submission to prevent automated spam.

  1. Identify Shortcode: The plugin uses [form_maker id="ID"].
  2. Create Test Page:
    • wp post create --post_type=page --post_status=publish --post_title="Contact" --post_content='[form_maker id="1"]' (assuming Form ID 1 exists).
  3. Navigate and Extract:
    • Use browser_navigate to the newly created page.
    • Form Maker localizes its data in a variable, often named fm_object or similar, or attaches nonces to the form DOM.
    • Inferred JS Variable: window.fm_object?.ajax_nonce or window.fm_ajax?.nonce.
    • Alternative: Extract from the hidden input field in the form: browser_eval("document.querySelector('input[name=\"fm_nonce\"]')?.value").

5. Exploitation Strategy

The goal is to submit a form containing a payload in a hidden field.

  • Step 1: Discovery
    • Locate an existing form ID: wp db query "SELECT id FROM wp_form_maker"
    • Check if it has a hidden field: wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_form_maker WHERE id=1" (Analyze the form_fields column which is usually JSON).
  • Step 2: Setup (If needed)
    • If no form exists or no form has a hidden field, create one via WP-CLI or the UI (see Section 6).
  • Step 3: Submission Request
    • Method: POST
    • URL: http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
    • Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    • Body (Example):
      action=form_maker_submit&
      form_id=1&
      field_1=NormalData&
      field_HIDDEN_ID=&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)&gt;&
      nonce=[EXTRACTED_NONCE]
      
    • Note: field_HIDDEN_ID represents the actual ID/name of the hidden field in the form.

6. Test Data Setup

  1. Create a Form: Ensure a form exists with a hidden field.
    • If creating manually via WP-CLI is complex due to serialized/JSON data, use browser_navigate to wp-admin/admin.php?page=form_maker and create a form with one "Hidden" field.
  2. Identify Field IDs: Note the ID assigned to the hidden field (e.g., 4).
  3. Publish Form: Create a page with the shortcode [form_maker id="X"] where X is the new form ID.

7. Expected Results

  • The http_request for submission should return a success message (e.g., {"status":"success"} or a success redirect).
  • When an admin logs in and visits Form Maker > Submissions, the browser should execute the JavaScript in the context of the WordPress admin.

8. Verification Steps

  1. Database Check:
    • wp db query "SELECT * FROM wp_form_maker_submits ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1"
    • Verify the element_value for the hidden field contains the payload &lt;img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)&gt;.
  2. UI Check (Automated):
    • Log in as admin.
    • Navigate to the submissions page for the specific form.
    • Use browser_eval("document.body.innerHTML.includes('<img src=x onerror=alert')") to confirm the decoded payload is present in the source.

9. Alternative Approaches

  • Double Encoding: If the plugin has some sanitization on submission, try double encoding the payload: &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;.
  • Submission via Frontend: Instead of admin-ajax.php, navigate to the published page using browser_navigate and use browser_type to fill and submit the form, which ensures all required JS-generated fields are included.
  • Different Hidden Source: Form Maker hidden fields can sometimes be populated via URL parameters. Try: http://localhost:8080/contact-page/?hidden_field_name=&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt; and then submitting the form normally.
Research Findings
Static analysis — not yet PoC-verified

Summary

The Form Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via hidden field values. The plugin incorrectly uses html_entity_decode() on user-supplied hidden field input before displaying it in the admin submissions list, allowing attackers to bypass initial entity encoding and execute arbitrary JavaScript in an administrator's browser session.

Vulnerable Code

// Inferred from research plan code flow analysis
// Located in the submissions display logic, likely in admin views

if ($field_type === 'hidden') {
    // The plugin retrieves the stored value and decodes entities without subsequent escaping
    echo html_entity_decode($field_value);
}

Security Fix

--- a/admin/views/WDFMViewSubmissions.php
+++ b/admin/views/WDFMViewSubmissions.php
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
             if ($field_type == 'hidden') {
-                echo html_entity_decode($field_value);
+                echo esc_html($field_value);
             }

Exploit Outline

1. Identify a public-facing form created by Form Maker that contains at least one 'Hidden' field type. 2. Extract the required submission nonce (typically found in the form's HTML as a hidden input named 'fm_nonce' or localized in the 'fm_object' JavaScript variable). 3. Craft a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the action 'form_maker_submit' and the target form ID. 4. In the parameter corresponding to the hidden field, include an HTML-entity-encoded XSS payload (e.g., '&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)&gt;'). 5. Wait for an administrator to view the submissions for that specific form in the WordPress dashboard. 6. Upon loading the submissions list, the plugin decodes the entity-encoded payload back into executable HTML, triggering the script in the admin's session.

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