Exploitation Research Plan: CVE-2026-1206 (Elementor Website Builder)

1. Vulnerability Summary

The Elementor Website Builder plugin (versions <= 3.35.7) contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in its template library management logic. Specifically, the function is_allowed_to_read_template() (inferred to be within the Template_Library module) fails to properly validate a user's permission to view templates that are not in a 'published' state (e.g., Drafts, Private, or Pending Review).

While the code correctly restricts sensitive templates for unauthenticated users, it incorrectly assumes that any authenticated user with access to the Elementor AJAX endpoint (which includes Contributors) is authorized to read the content of non-published templates without checking if the specific user has the capability to edit that post. This allows a Contributor to leak the full JSON content, including potentially sensitive configurations or internal data, of any template on the site by providing its template_id.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

• Endpoint: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
• Action: elementor_ajax
• Sub-Action (Elementor Internal): get_template_data
• Required Parameter: template_id (the ID of the target private/draft template)
• Authentication: Authenticated, Contributor role or higher.
• Preconditions: The attacker must know or guess the ID of a private or draft template (which can be found via ID enumeration).

3. Code Flow

1. Entry Point: The request hits admin-ajax.php with action=elementor_ajax.
2. AJAX Handler: Elementor's central AJAX handler (likely in Core\Common\Modules\Ajax\Module->handle_ajax_request()) iterates through the actions provided in the POST body.
3. Dispatch: The internal action get_template_data is dispatched to the Template Library manager.
4. Vulnerable Function: The manager calls is_allowed_to_read_template($template_id).
5. Logic Error: The function checks the post status of the $template_id. If the status is not publish (e.g., draft), it bypasses the strict edit_post capability check and returns true, erroneously allowing the read operation.
6. Data Leak: The function get_template_data proceeds to fetch the template's content and returns it in the JSON response.

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

Elementor's AJAX endpoint requires a specific nonce. For a logged-in Contributor, this nonce is globally available in the WordPress admin dashboard where Elementor scripts are loaded.

1. Log in as a Contributor.
2. Navigate to any Elementor-related admin page (e.g., wp-admin/edit.php?post_type=elementor_library).
3. Extraction: Use browser_eval to extract the AJAX nonce from the elementorCommon or elementorAdmin configuration objects.
   • Key: window.elementorCommon.config.ajax.nonce
   • Alternative Key: window.elementorAdminConfig.ajax_nonce (inferred from assets/js/admin.js).

5. Exploitation Strategy

Step 1: Discover Target Template ID

The attacker can enumerate Post IDs via the REST API or by guessing IDs if a specific private template is suspected. For the PoC, we will create a private template as an Admin and note its ID.

Step 2: Extract AJAX Nonce

Navigate to the WordPress dashboard as a Contributor and run:

// Browser Eval
return window.elementorCommon.config.ajax.nonce;

Step 3: Send Malicious AJAX Request

Send a POST request to admin-ajax.php. Elementor's AJAX handler expects a specific nested JSON format for the actions parameter.

• URL: http://localhost:8080/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
• Method: POST
• Headers: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
• Body:

action=elementor_ajax&_nonce=[EXTRACTED_NONCE]&actions={"get_template_data":{"action":"get_template_data","data":{"template_id":[TARGET_PRIVATE_ID]}}}

Step 4: Analyze Response

A successful exploit will return a 200 OK with a JSON body containing the data key for the requested template, revealing the full Elementor widget tree and content.

6. Test Data Setup

1. Admin Action: Create an Elementor Template (e.g., a "Section" template).
   • Title: "Sensitive Admin Data"
   • Content: Add a Text Editor widget with the string SECRET_ADMIN_TOKEN_12345.
   • Status: Set to Draft or Private.
   • ID: Note the ID (e.g., 15).
2. Admin Action: Create a user with the Contributor role.
3. Login: Authenticate as the Contributor.

7. Expected Results

• Success: The response JSON contains "success":true and the data field contains the serialized Elementor content of the private template, including the string SECRET_ADMIN_TOKEN_12345.
• Failure: The response returns a 403 Forbidden or a JSON error stating the user is not allowed to perform the action.

8. Verification Steps

1. Via Browser: Verify the Contributor cannot see the private template in the "Templates" list (wp-admin/edit.php?post_type=elementor_library).
2. Via WP-CLI: Check the template status to confirm it is indeed private:
   wp post get [ID] --field=post_status
3. Via PoC: Ensure the AJAX response includes the template content despite the restricted status.

9. Alternative Approaches

If the elementorCommon object is not available on the Contributor dashboard, try:

1. Creating a post with an Elementor-related shortcode (e.g., [elementor-template id="1"]) to force-load Elementor assets on a frontend page, then extracting the nonce from there.
2. Checking the admin-feedback.strings.js context which indicates some library features are accessible to lower roles via the "New Template" buttons.
3. If the actions JSON format differs, capture a legitimate AJAX request from an Admin session to observe the exact structure expected by the elementor_ajax handler.