Connect Contact Form 7 and Mailchimp <= 0.9.78.06 - Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Mailchimp Merge Field Values
Description
The Connect Contact Form 7 and Mailchimp plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Mailchimp Merge Field Values in all versions up to, and including, 0.9.78.06 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The injected payload is only triggered when a privileged user (Administrator) performs a Contact Lookup for the email address submitted via the CF7 form, meaning execution is deferred until an administrator interacts with the affected entry.
CVSS Vector Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NTechnical Details
<=0.9.78.06Source Code
WordPress.org SVNPatched version not available.
I cannot fulfill your request to produce a detailed exploitation research plan or specific actionable payloads for CVE-2026-15000. My safety guidelines prohibit the generation of material that facilitates the functional exploitation of vulnerabilities in specific software. Instead, I can explain th…
Show full research plan
I cannot fulfill your request to produce a detailed exploitation research plan or specific actionable payloads for CVE-2026-15000. My safety guidelines prohibit the generation of material that facilitates the functional exploitation of vulnerabilities in specific software.
Instead, I can explain the mechanics of Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in the context of WordPress plugins and the defensive practices necessary to prevent such issues when handling data from third-party APIs.
Understanding Stored XSS via Third-Party APIs
Stored XSS occurs when an application receives data from an untrusted source and includes that data within its later HTTP responses in an unsafe way. In the case of WordPress plugins that integrate with services like Mailchimp, the vulnerability often arises during the "Data Feedback Loop."
The Vulnerability Mechanism
- Ingestion: A plugin collects user input (e.g., through a Contact Form 7 submission) and sends it to an external API (e.g., Mailchimp). If the plugin does not sanitize the data before sending it, the external service stores the potentially malicious payload.
- Retrieval: At a later time, a privileged user (such as an Administrator) performs an action that triggers the plugin to fetch data back from the external API.
- Unsafe Rendering: The plugin receives the data (now containing the payload) and renders it within the WordPress Admin Dashboard. If the plugin uses functions like
echoorprinton this data without context-specific escaping (likeesc_html()oresc_attr()), the payload executes in the administrator's browser.
Secure Coding Practices in WordPress
To prevent this class of vulnerability, developers must adhere to the principle of "Escaping on Output."
1. Context-Specific Escaping
Every piece of data retrieved from an external source (database or API) must be escaped based on where it is being displayed:
- HTML Body: Use
esc_html(). This converts characters like<and>into HTML entities, preventing the browser from interpreting them as tags. - HTML Attributes: Use
esc_attr(). This is critical for data placed inside attributes likevalue=""ortitle="". - JavaScript Variables: Use
wp_json_encode(). This ensures that data passed from PHP to JavaScript is properly formatted as a JSON object, preventing breakout from script strings.
2. Input Sanitization
While escaping on output is the primary defense against XSS, input sanitization provides "defense in depth." Before sending data to an external API, plugins should use WordPress sanitization functions:
sanitize_text_field(): Strips tags and line breaks.sanitize_email(): Ensures the data conforms to email standards.
3. Administrative Nonces
For actions like "Contact Lookups" in the admin dashboard, WordPress nonces (Number used ONCE) should be implemented to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). A nonce ensures that the request to fetch data was intentionally initiated by the authorized user.
- Generation:
wp_create_nonce( 'lookup_action' ) - Verification:
check_admin_referer( 'lookup_action' )orcheck_ajax_referer( 'lookup_action' )
For further learning on securing WordPress plugins, I recommend consulting the WordPress Plugin Handbook and the OWASP Top Ten project.
Summary
The Connect Contact Form 7 and Mailchimp plugin is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Mailchimp Merge Field Values due to improper output escaping of data retrieved from the Mailchimp API. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a Contact Form 7 entry containing malicious JavaScript, which is then stored in Mailchimp and executed in the context of an administrator's browser when they perform a contact lookup or view the entry in the WordPress dashboard.
Exploit Outline
1. Identify a public Contact Form 7 on the target site that is integrated with Mailchimp using the plugin. 2. Submit the form with a malicious payload (e.g., <script>alert(1)</script>) in a field mapped to a Mailchimp merge field, such as the First Name or Last Name field. 3. The plugin transmits this un-sanitized data to Mailchimp, where it is stored as part of the subscriber's profile. 4. Wait for a site administrator to access the plugin's admin interface and perform a 'Contact Lookup' for the email address used in the submission. 5. The plugin fetches the merge field data from Mailchimp and renders it directly into the admin page without escaping, causing the browser to execute the attacker's script.
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