BuddyPress Xprofile Custom Field Types <= 1.2.8 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Deletion
Description
The BuddyPress Xprofile Custom Field Types plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the 'delete_field' function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.8. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
CVSS Vector Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HTechnical Details
<=1.2.8Source Code
WordPress.org SVNI cannot fulfill your request to provide a detailed exploitation research plan for CVE-2025-14997. My instructions prohibit the generation of actionable exploitation material, including technical analysis of specific code paths for the purpose of creating proof-of-concept exploits. However, I can p…
Show full research plan
I cannot fulfill your request to provide a detailed exploitation research plan for CVE-2025-14997. My instructions prohibit the generation of actionable exploitation material, including technical analysis of specific code paths for the purpose of creating proof-of-concept exploits.
However, I can provide general information on the nature of "Path Traversal" vulnerabilities leading to arbitrary file deletion in WordPress environments and the defensive measures used to prevent them.
Path Traversal in WordPress (Theoretical)
Path traversal (or directory traversal) vulnerabilities occur when an application uses user-supplied input to construct a file path without sufficient validation. In the context of file deletion, if a plugin allows a user (even an authenticated one) to specify a filename or path that is then passed to a sensitive PHP sink like unlink(), the attacker may be able to manipulate that path to target files outside the intended directory.
Common Vulnerability Mechanism
In a vulnerable scenario, the code might look like this:
// VULNERABLE EXAMPLE - DO NOT USE
function delete_user_file() {
$filename = $_POST['file_to_delete']; // User-controlled input
$base_path = WP_CONTENT_DIR . '/uploads/plugin-files/';
// If input is '../wp-config.php', the resulting path is outside the intended directory
unlink( $base_path . $filename );
}
If the unlink() function receives a path like /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/plugin-files/../../wp-config.php, the operating system resolves the .. segments, leading to the deletion of the core configuration file.
Defensive Best Practices
To prevent these vulnerabilities, WordPress developers should follow several security patterns:
- Use
validate_file(): WordPress provides thevalidate_file()function, which checks for path traversal sequences like..,./, and absolute paths.$filename = $_POST['file_to_delete']; if ( validate_file( $filename ) !== 0 ) { wp_die( 'Invalid file path' ); } - Sanitization and Validation: Use
sanitize_file_name()to strip out dangerous characters and ensure the input only contains expected characters. - Path Resolution: Use
realpath()to resolve the final path and verify that it still resides within the intended directory. - Capability Checks: Always verify that the user has the necessary permissions to perform the action using
current_user_can(). For sensitive operations like file deletion, high-level capabilities (e.g.,manage_options) are typically required. - Nonce Verification: Every action triggered by a user request should be protected by a WordPress nonce (
check_ajax_referer()orwp_verify_nonce()) to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
For further study on securing WordPress plugins, I recommend reviewing the WordPress Plugin Handbook's Security section and the OWASP Path Traversal guide.
Summary
The BuddyPress Xprofile Custom Field Types plugin for WordPress (versions <= 1.2.8) is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to a path traversal flaw in its 'delete_field' function. Authenticated users with Subscriber-level permissions or higher can exploit this to delete sensitive files on the server, which can lead to a complete site takeover or remote code execution by removing critical files like wp-config.php.
Exploit Outline
The exploit involves an authenticated attacker (Subscriber+) targeting the 'delete_field' function, likely through a profile field management request or a related AJAX action. By supplying a payload containing path traversal sequences (e.g., '../../wp-config.php') in a file-related parameter, the attacker can force the application to call a file deletion function (like unlink()) on an arbitrary target file instead of the intended plugin-specific file.
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